Family Law • Protection Orders & Breach Proceedings

Protection Orders Under Section 18 Domestic Violence Act: Interim Relief, Breach, FIR, Bail, Evidence and Appeal

How protection orders are framed, when breach becomes an offence under Sections 31–32, and how service, proof, arrest safeguards, bail, limitation and appellate remedies operate.

A protection order under Section 18 of the Protection of Women from Domestic Violence Act, 2005 is a preventive judicial direction. It may restrain future violence, communication, entry into specified places, dealing with assets, harassment of relatives or any other act precisely identified by the Magistrate.

The legal consequence of clarity is substantial. Breach of a protection order or interim protection order is the specific offence created by Section 31. Section 32 makes that offence cognizable and non-bailable and permits the court, in an appropriate case, to act on the sole testimony of the aggrieved person. Since penal consequences follow, the operative order and the alleged breach must both be examined with precision.

1. When may a Section 18 protection order be passed?

Section 18 authorises the Magistrate to pass a protection order after giving the aggrieved person and respondent an opportunity of hearing and upon being prima facie satisfied that domestic violence has taken place or is likely to take place.

The statutory enquiry therefore requires:

• a qualifying domestic relationship;
• an aggrieved person within the Act;
• material disclosing domestic violence under Section 3 or a real likelihood of it;
• a connection between the apprehended harm and the respondent;
• necessity for the particular restraint sought; and
• an order proportionate to the proved or prima facie risk.

A final protection order is not meant to reproduce every allegation in the application. It should identify the restrained conduct in terms capable of being understood and obeyed.

2. What restraints can be imposed under Section 18?

The Magistrate may prohibit the respondent from:

• committing any act of domestic violence;
• aiding or abetting domestic violence;
• entering the aggrieved person’s place of employment;
• entering a child’s school or another place frequented by the aggrieved person;
• attempting communication by personal, oral, written, electronic or telephonic contact;
• alienating assets or operating specified lockers or accounts used or enjoyed by the parties, including stridhan or other jointly or separately held property, without leave of court;
• causing violence to dependants, relatives or persons assisting the aggrieved person; and
• committing any other act specifically stated in the protection order.

The power is broad but not unstructured. A communication restraint should address necessary exceptions for court proceedings, child handover, medical emergencies, lawyers or a designated electronic channel. A workplace or school restriction should identify the place. An asset restraint should identify the asset or account as far as practicable and avoid unintentionally disabling lawful business or essential household payments beyond the case pleaded.

3. Protection order is different from residence, maintenance and custody relief

The DV Act creates separate remedies:

• Section 18 — protection orders;
• Section 19 — residence orders;
• Section 20 — monetary relief;
• Section 21 — temporary custody;
• Section 22 — compensation and damages; and
• Section 23 — interim and ex parte orders.

An order may combine more than one form of relief, but each operative clause retains its statutory character. A direction not to contact or threaten the aggrieved person may be protective. A direction to pay monthly maintenance is monetary. A direction allowing residence is a residence order.

This classification matters because Section 31 attaches criminal punishment only to breach of a protection order or interim protection order. The precise clause allegedly violated must therefore be identified before an FIR or complaint is pursued.

For connected reliefs, see our guides to residence orders under Section 19 and monetary relief under Section 20.

4. Interim and ex parte protection under Section 23

Section 23(1) permits the Magistrate to pass an interim order considered just and proper. Under Section 23(2), an ex parte order may be passed on the prescribed affidavit if the material prima facie discloses that the respondent is committing, has committed or is likely to commit an act of domestic violence.

An urgent application should state:

• the last and threatened incidents with dates and places;
• why notice may expose the applicant or child to immediate harm;
• the precise person, place, account or communication requiring restraint;
• police complaints, medical material, messages or recordings relied upon;
• pending criminal, matrimonial or child-related proceedings;
• prior protective directions and any alleged breach; and
• the exact interim wording requested.

Because an interim protection order may carry Section 31 penal consequences, vague formulations should be avoided. The order should separately state the protective clauses and any residence, monetary or custody clauses.

The broader application, service and evidence framework is explained in our guide to Section 12 Domestic Violence Act proceedings.

5. Service and communication of the order

Proof that the respondent was bound by and knew of the operative restraint is central to a fair breach prosecution. The record should contain the order, service report and material showing when and how it was communicated.

Depending on the case, relevant material may include:

• formal service through the Protection Officer or process server;
• signed acknowledgment;
• presence when the order was pronounced;
• a statement by counsel recorded in the order sheet;
• certified electronic service or court-generated communication;
• a reply, appeal or modification application admitting knowledge; and
• messages demonstrating actual awareness of the restraint.

Actual knowledge may be evidentially relevant, but disputed informal communication should not be treated casually when criminal liability is alleged. The prosecution must establish the binding order, its operative terms and the accused’s legally relevant knowledge beyond reasonable doubt.

6. Ingredients of the Section 31 offence

For a conviction under Section 31(1), the prosecution must establish:

1. a valid protection order or interim protection order;
2. that the accused was the respondent bound by it;
3. that the order was in force at the time of the alleged act;
4. the specific operative direction relied upon;
5. service or knowledge sufficient in the circumstances;
6. a proved act or omission amounting to breach of that direction; and
7. identity of the accused and attribution of the alleged conduct.

The punishment may extend to imprisonment of either description for one year, or fine up to twenty thousand rupees, or both. As far as practicable, the offence is to be tried by the Magistrate who passed the order alleged to have been breached.

7. Not every act of domestic violence is itself an offence under the DV Act

The Delhi High Court in Savita Bhanot v. Lt. Col. V.D. Bhanot, 168 (2010) DLT 68, explained that the DV Act predominantly provides civil protective remedies. Section 31 creates criminal liability for breach of a protection order; it does not make every act falling within the broad civil definition of domestic violence separately punishable under the DV Act.

This does not immunise conduct punishable under the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, Dowry Prohibition Act or another penal law. The same facts may disclose an independent criminal offence. The legal basis must be correctly identified rather than treating Section 3 DV Act itself as a general penal provision.

In Vishal Shah v. Monalisha Gupta, 2025 INSC 254, the Supreme Court reiterated that ordinary DV Act proceedings are quasi-criminal and do not entail penal consequences except where there is breach of a protection order, the offence provided by Section 31.

8. Breach of residence or monetary orders

Section 31 must be strictly applied to the order named by the legislature. Failure to pay maintenance under Section 20, by itself, is not breach of a Section 18 protection order. Nor is every dispute about implementation of a Section 19 residence order automatically a Section 31 offence.

The correct remedies may include execution, an employer or debtor direction under Section 20(6), police assistance within Section 19(7), clarification, modification, appeal or another procedurally available enforcement measure. Criminal prosecution under Section 31 requires an actual protective clause and a breach of that clause.

A combined order needs clause-by-clause analysis. If the same act both violates a clearly worded Section 18 restraint and interferes with residence, Section 31 may be attracted because of the protective restraint—not merely because a residence direction also exists.

9. Cognizable and non-bailable: what Section 32 means

Section 32(1) declares the Section 31(1) offence cognizable and non-bailable. “Cognizable” permits police investigation according to the criminal-procedure law without first obtaining a Magistrate’s order of the kind required for a non-cognizable offence. “Non-bailable” means bail is discretionary; it does not mean bail is legally unavailable.

Arrest is not automatic merely because the offence is cognizable. Section 35 BNSS requires the police to assess the statutory necessity of arrest for offences punishable below seven years. Where arrest is not required, a notice of appearance is to be issued. Compliance with the notice ordinarily protects against arrest unless recorded reasons justify it. Section 35(7) also prescribes prior permission of an officer not below Deputy Superintendent of Police where an offence is punishable below three years and the person is infirm or above sixty years of age.

For incidents governed by the earlier Code of Criminal Procedure because of repeal-and-savings provisions, the corresponding CrPC safeguards and applicable Supreme Court directions must be examined.

10. Bail and anticipatory bail

Since the offence is non-bailable, regular bail is considered judicially. Where arrest is reasonably apprehended, anticipatory bail may be sought under the applicable BNSS provision, subject to the case facts and local jurisdiction.

Relevant considerations may include:

• nature and clarity of the protection order;
• proof and gravity of the alleged breach;
• threat perception and risk of repetition;
• cooperation with investigation;
• electronic and documentary evidence already secured;
• criminal antecedents;
• attempts to contact or influence the aggrieved person or witnesses;
• medical condition, age and residence;
• compliance with notice of appearance; and
• willingness to obey protective conditions without prejudice to legal rights.

A bail order can impose conditions preventing contact, entry into specified places, intimidation or destruction of evidence. Bail conditions should not decide disputed matrimonial or property rights beyond what is necessary for the criminal proceeding.

11. Sole testimony under Section 32(2)

Section 32(2) states that the court may conclude, upon the sole testimony of the aggrieved person, that a Section 31(1) offence has been committed. Corroboration is therefore not an inflexible legal prerequisite.

The word “may” does not create automatic conviction. The testimony must still be legally admissible, credible and sufficient to prove the specific breach beyond reasonable doubt. The court must evaluate consistency, the wording of the order, surrounding circumstances, electronic material, delays, motive, opportunity and the defence version.

Where independent material naturally exists—CCTV, call records, messages, witnesses, access logs or police diaries—its preservation and production materially improves adjudication.

12. Electronic communication and digital evidence

Section 18(d) expressly extends to electronic and telephonic contact. Alleged breach may involve calls, messages, email, social-media accounts, location-sharing, digital payments carrying messages or contact through another person.

The evidentiary record should preserve:

• the complete conversation rather than selected screenshots;
• date, time, account identifier and device details;
• original device and export where available;
• call-detail and subscriber records obtained lawfully;
• metadata and electronic-evidence certification required by law;
• proof linking the account or device to the accused;
• evidence of blocking, impersonation or compromise where alleged; and
• the exact protection clause said to prohibit the contact.

Forwarded messages and screenshots without provenance may be challenged. Attribution is separate from proof that a message was received.

13. Communication through lawyers, relatives or children

A no-contact clause may prohibit direct and indirect communication, depending on its wording. Communication through relatives, friends, colleagues or children may amount to breach if it is proved to be at the respondent’s instance and falls within the restraint.

Necessary communication for litigation or child arrangements should use the channel authorised by the order—counsel, a parenting application, email, mediator or designated family member. If the order is silent and communication is unavoidable, clarification should be sought instead of testing the boundaries of a penal restraint.

14. Additional charges under Section 31(3)

While framing charge for the Section 31 offence, the Magistrate may also frame charges under Section 498A IPC, another IPC provision or the Dowry Prohibition Act if the facts disclose those offences.

For post-1 July 2024 conduct, Sections 85 and 86 of the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita contain the cruelty offence and definition corresponding to the former Section 498A framework. Section 8 of the General Clauses Act governs construction of statutory references to provisions that have been repealed and re-enacted, unless a different intention appears. The date of each alleged act and the repeal-and-savings provisions must be applied carefully; penal liability cannot be retrospectively enlarged.

Additional charges are not automatic. Each proposed offence requires its own factual ingredients, cognizance requirements and proof.

15. Limitation for a Section 31 prosecution

Because Section 31 carries imprisonment up to one year, the ordinary limitation category under Section 514(2)(b) BNSS is one year. The statutory explanation links computation to the date of filing the complaint under Section 223 or recording information under Section 173. Section 519 permits cognizance after expiry where delay is properly explained or extension is necessary in the interests of justice.

Where the earlier CrPC applies under savings, Section 468 and the connected provisions must be examined. Separate alleged breaches, recurring conduct and excluded periods require incident-specific analysis; limitation should not be calculated from an assumed single date without reviewing the order, FIR or complaint and chronology.

16. Duration, modification and revocation

Under Section 25(1), a Section 18 protection order remains in force until the aggrieved person applies for discharge. Section 25(2) separately permits either the aggrieved person or respondent to seek alteration, modification or revocation when a change in circumstances requires it, with reasons recorded in writing.

Changed circumstances may include:

• settlement or long-term separation;
• new residence or employment;
• changed child-contact arrangements;
• closure or change of workplace or school;
• new criminal or civil orders;
• demonstrated misuse or repeated breach;
• medical or caregiving necessity; and
• an obsolete, impossible or excessively broad restraint.

Until varied or stayed, the order should be obeyed. A party should not treat a pending modification application as permission to disregard the operative restraint.

17. Appeal and stay

A protection order or interim protection order may be challenged before the Court of Session under Section 29 within thirty days from service of the Magistrate’s order on the aggrieved person or respondent, whichever is later. The appeal does not automatically suspend the order. A specific stay or modification application should address urgency, safety, proportionality and the conduct proposed during the appeal.

Where a Magistrate convicts an accused after a Section 31 trial, the conviction is challenged through the criminal appellate framework. Section 415(3) BNSS provides an appeal from a Magistrate’s conviction to the Court of Session, subject to the applicable statutory exceptions. Suspension of sentence and bail pending appeal require separate orders.

Our detailed procedural guide to Section 29 DV Act appeals addresses limitation, stay and filing practice.

18. Jurisdiction, procedure and court fee

A Section 18 protection order is ordinarily sought through a Section 12 application before the competent Judicial Magistrate First Class or Metropolitan Magistrate. Section 27 permits filing where the aggrieved person permanently or temporarily resides, carries on business or is employed; where the respondent resides, carries on business or is employed; or where the cause of action arose.

Section 28 applies the criminal-procedure framework to proceedings under Sections 12 and 18–23 and to the Section 31 offence. Section 28(2) allows the court to formulate its own procedure for disposal of a Section 12 application or Section 23(2) interim application. The civil-relief stage and the later criminal prosecution must not be procedurally conflated.

The central Act does not prescribe an ad valorem court fee for seeking a protection order. Local process fee, affidavit, copying and filing requirements may apply. A Section 31 FIR does not attract civil court fee.

19. Evidence checklist for alleging breach

• certified copy of the protection or interim protection order;
• proof of service, communication or admitted knowledge;
• order sheet showing presence or representation;
• chronology of each alleged breach;
• messages, call logs, emails and full electronic context;
• CCTV, access-control or location material;
• workplace, school or security records;
• names and statements of independent witnesses;
• police calls, daily diary entries and prior complaints;
• medical records if violence accompanied the breach;
• asset or bank records for a prohibited transaction; and
• material connecting indirect communication to the respondent.

20. Defence checklist in a Section 31 case

• whether the relied-upon clause is actually a Section 18 restraint;
• whether the order was valid, operative and binding on the accused;
• service and actual knowledge of the exact terms;
• ambiguity or absence of the alleged prohibition;
• identity and attribution of calls, accounts or third-party conduct;
• complete electronic record rather than selective screenshots;
• authorised exceptions for litigation, children or emergencies;
• impossibility, mistaken location or factual alibi;
• delay and limitation;
• contradictions between complaint, statement and digital record;
• pending stay, variation or clarification orders; and
• whether separate penal allegations independently satisfy their ingredients.

A challenge to the correctness of the original protection order does not ordinarily authorise disobedience while it remains operative. The stronger course is prompt appeal or modification together with a focused defence to the alleged breach.

Common Client Questions

Is every domestic-violence allegation a criminal offence under the DV Act?

No. The DV Act principally provides protective civil remedies. Section 31 creates the specific offence of breaching a protection or interim protection order. Independent conduct may still constitute an offence under other penal laws.

Can non-payment of maintenance lead to an FIR under Section 31?

Not merely because a Section 20 monetary order remains unpaid. Section 31 requires breach of a protection or interim protection order. Monetary relief has its own enforcement mechanisms.

Is the Section 31 offence bailable?

It is statutorily non-bailable, meaning bail is discretionary. Bail and anticipatory bail remain legally available subject to the facts and applicable procedure.

Does a cognizable offence mean automatic arrest?

No. Police must apply the arrest-necessity safeguards under Section 35 BNSS or the applicable saved CrPC regime. Notice of appearance is required where arrest is unnecessary.

Can conviction rest on the woman’s testimony alone?

Section 32(2) permits that result, but the testimony must still be credible, legally admissible and sufficient to establish the specific breach beyond reasonable doubt.

How long does a protection order remain effective?

Section 25(1) states that it remains in force until the aggrieved person applies for discharge. Either party may seek alteration, modification or revocation under Section 25(2) upon a relevant change in circumstances.

What is the appeal limitation?

For an order challenged under Section 29 DV Act, the period is thirty days from service on the aggrieved person or respondent, whichever is later. A criminal conviction follows the separate criminal appellate framework.

Authoritative legal sources

• Section 18, Protection of Women from Domestic Violence Act — India Code
• Section 31, Protection of Women from Domestic Violence Act — India Code
• Protection of Women from Domestic Violence Act, 2005 — India Code
• Section 35, Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita — arrest safeguards
• Section 514 BNSS — limitation for taking cognizance
• Vishal Shah v. Monalisha Gupta, 2025 INSC 254
• Savita Bhanot v. Lt. Col. V.D. Bhanot, 168 (2010) DLT 68

Legally reviewed: 20 August 2026. Disclaimer: This article provides general legal education. Protection-order and breach cases depend on the exact operative clause, service, chronology, evidence, applicable criminal-procedure regime and independent penal allegations. Obtain advice on the complete record before seeking enforcement, arrest protection, bail, modification or appeal.